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INTRODUCTION	  
Alex D.1 was bored and drifting as he sat in his English Literature 
class one gray winter day. Looking to amuse himself, he did what many 
teens do. He looked down at his cell phone to check for messages. Alex 
knew he was violating a school rule that prohibited cell phone use during 
class, but he figured he could get away with it. His teacher, however, 
noticed Alex’s downward glances and recognized the telltale sign of 
probable cell phone use. She promptly confronted him and confiscated 
the phone. 
The teacher was enforcing what has become a common policy in 
many schools.2 When class was over, she took the phone to the main 
office where it would be held until the end of the day.  
On this particular day, however, things progressed a little 
differently. The school principal took possession of the phone after it 
was brought into the office. Acting upon general rumors of drug dealing 
in the school, she opened Alex’s phone and started reading the stored 
text messages. She found a very recent text message from “Brian” that 
                                                
* Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law. The author wishes to 
thank Professors Kimberly Kirkland, Dana Remus, John Greabe, Chris Johnson, Risa 
Evans, and Richard Albert for their ideas and feedback. In addition, the author extends 
her appreciation to Research Assistants Lauren Breda, Nathan Warecki and Caroline 
Schleh for the many hours of work they provided. The author thanks Roger Wellington 
for his editing contributions, and Honorable Paul Barbadoro and Attorney David 
Rothstein for their advice and feedback Finally, the author is grateful to “Brian”—now 
a successful college student—who was willing to share his personal experience. 
1 These facts are based on a true story. 
2 Virginia Groark, Tired of Interruptions, Schools Ban Cell Phones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2001, at 14CN; Paul Lieberman, Parents Answer Cell Phone Ban in N.Y. Schools, L.A. 
TIMES, May 29, 2006, at A4; Region in Brief, Cell Phones Now Banned in Hub’s Schools, 
BOS. HERALD, Mar. 24, 2005, News at 33. 
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read: “Yo, need a bag?”3 The principal, pretending to be Alex, responded 
to the text: “yea I can wait at back door . . . I will hide out in a room and 
look for u.”  
Brian replied quickly and the principal, posing as Alex, began a 
lengthy text conversation that culminated in an agreement to meet in a 
nearby parking lot so “Alex” could purchase a bag of marijuana.4 
Unaware of the ruse, Brian showed up at the parking lot, where he was 
arrested by the police with the principal looking on.  
The principal reported to the police that she routinely scrolled 
through students’ confiscated phones and placed calls to numbers in the 
contact list in an attempt to catch students using their phones in school.5 
Although perhaps not as proactively as the principal of Alex’s school, 
administrators are playing out similar scenarios all around the country.6 
Given the potential for disruption and distraction, it is clearly reasonable 
to enjoin student use of cell phones during instructional periods. 
Confiscation of a cell phone is a logical consequence for violating the 
rule. However, what school officials can lawfully do with a phone after 
confiscation is not clear.  
Over seventy-five percent of teenagers carry a cell phone on a 
daily basis, and many use the device as a private diary and portal for 
personal data and information.7 When the principal opened Alex’s phone 
and began searching through his texts and information, she could have 
stumbled upon a variety of personal information and images including 
appointments with therapists or doctors, personal messages related to 
                                                
3 Clare Trapasso, Teen Sues After Principal Lures Him into Alleged Drug Deal, UNION 
LEADER, Apr. 18, 2008, at A6.  
4 The case discussed here took place at a private school where administrators are 
unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment. However, this type of scenario is routinely 
played out in public schools. 
5 Police report - on file with author.  
6 High School Not Confidential: When Officials Search Student Cell Phones, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 2012, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-
05/news/ct-edit-stevenson-20120205_1_school-searches-strip-search-stevenson-student; 
Marc Freeman,  Student Rights Group Targets Boca High Cellphone Searches, Sun 
Sentinel, July 26, 2011, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-07-
26/specialsection/fl-boca-high-cell-phone-complaint-20110725_1_student-cellphones-
student-phones-high-school-student-handbook; Rick Rojas, School Phone Policies 
Assessed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/ 
12/local/la-me-cellphones-20111112; J.W. v. DeSoto County Sch. Dist., 2:09-CV-
00155-MPM, 2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).  
7 Amanda Lenhart et al., More and More Teens on Cell Phones, PEW INTERNET AND 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/ 
1315/teens-use-of-cell-phones. 
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private family or medical issues, or embarrassing text messages with 
friends that have nothing to do with criminal activity. The cell phone—
practically an appendage of most teenagers these days—is an extension 
of a teenager’s life and its contents reflect a great deal about them.8  
Teens appear willing to capture in their phone’s text or photos 
their most private world. The ease with which that information can be 
uploaded to the internet (typically Facebook) might create an assumption 
that teens do not care about maintaining their privacy. However, the 
opposite is true. Teenagers are willing to share private information with 
their peers in text messages and place private data on their phones 
precisely because they expect them to remain private, or at least confined 
to a known world of friends and other contacts.9 When school 
administrators look at a student’s texts or other cell phone information, 
they open a door into the student’s private life.  
 In this article, I argue that school administrator searches of a 
student’s cell phone should require a warrant, unless there are urgent 
circumstances involving safety. Students who attend a public school 
come within the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment.10 How 
far those protections should go necessitates examining a student’s 
subjective view of what is private given their “adolescent vulnerability.”11 
In Safford v. Redding, the U.S. Supreme Court held a strip search of a 
student unlawful, in part because school childrens’ unique subjective 
view of their own privacy should be afforded special consideration. This 
same unique perspective should be applied to the contents of a student’s 
cell phone. Because “tweens” and teenagers in particular place so much 
private information on their phones, their expectation of privacy in their 
phones should be accorded substantial protection.  
Given that the vast majority of children in the United States 
attend public school (about ninety percent), most school administrators 
are bound by constitutional rules. Absent urgent safety concerns, school 
policies that allow warrantless searches of cell phones violate the Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests of students. After all, cell phones in and of 
themselves are not dangerous. They cannot hold drugs or weapons—
                                                
8 Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones: Text Messaging Explodes as Teens 
Embrace It as the Centerpiece of Their Communication Strategies with Friends, PEW 
INTERNET, Apr. 20, 2010, available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/ 
Reports/2010/PIP-Teens-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf. 
9 Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 
MISS. L. J. 1033, 1043 (2011). 
10 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). 
11 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009). 
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only information about drugs or weapons. Given that a cell phone 
contains highly private information, poses no imminent danger, and its 
contents can be preserved while a warrant is obtained, school officials 
should be required to get a warrant unless there are exigent 
circumstances such as an immediate, apparent threat to student safety. 
In the first part of this article, I explain the governing law on 
school searches and examine how a student’s expectation of privacy 
should be measured. Second, I explain the reasoning for requiring a 
warrant to search a student’s cell phone. Finally, I suggest guidelines for 
cell phone searches in school.  
I. FOURTH	  AMENDMENT	  RIGHTS	  IN	  THE	  SCHOOL	  CONTEXT	  
Although students may carry a backpack to school loaded with 
books, notebooks, and other items, many will deposit these belongings in 
their lockers. However, there is one item most students will keep with 
them at all times—their cell phone. It is hard to overestimate the 
importance of the cell phone in modern teen culture. It has become the 
essential communication device and is consulted with mind-numbing 
frequency.12  
Like their adult counterparts, students are protected from 
unreasonable searches, and thus, assuming that the school official’s 
conduct is a “search,” any Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on whether 
a search is reasonable or unreasonable.13 Unlike adults however, students 
in school enjoy less protection of their privacy because a student’s right 
to privacy in his or her belongings has been deemed secondary to 
concerns for students’ overall safety and well-being. Schools act in place 
of a parent—or, “in loco parentis.” Thus, “reasonableness” has a distinct 
definition for students in a school setting. Before a school official can 
search a student, the justification for the search must be “reasonable at 
its inception” and “reasonable in scope.”14 Most courts will give school 
officials wide latitude in what is “reasonable,” given the realities of 
keeping schools safe. School administrators can search lockers, 
backpacks, pocketbooks, and other items of personal property with only 
a moderate degree of suspicion—something more than a hunch, but less 
than what would be required to meet a “preponderance of evidence” 
standard.15  
                                                
12 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 82-84. 
13 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
14 Id. at 341-42 
15 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2647; Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 357 (Pa. 1998) 
(expectation of privacy in locker is minimal). 
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The more intrusive the search, the more suspicion needed—and 
thus searches fall along a spectrum of intrusiveness.16 Searches of lockers 
and backpacks fall close to one end of the spectrum because the level of 
intrusion on the student is low and thus less suspicion is needed.17 Strip 
searches fall on the opposite end of the spectrum and require the greatest 
degree of suspicion. Because searching a student’s body places the 
student in an embarrassing and exposed position, administrators must 
have individualized suspicion of the student’s wrongdoing and an 
indication of potential danger posed by the object of the search.18  
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., respondent, a fourteen-year-old high 
school freshman, was caught smoking in the bathroom along with her 
classmate in violation of school policy.19 When brought before the 
principal, the classmate admitted her infraction but T.L.O. maintained 
her innocence and said she did not smoke cigarettes.20 The principal 
demanded to see T.L.O.’s purse, opened the purse, and found a pack of 
cigarettes.21 As he retrieved the cigarettes, the principal noticed some 
rolling papers.22 Aware that students who smoke marijuana customarily 
use rolling papers, the principal suspected that searching further would 
reveal evidence of drug use.23 Indeed, a thorough search of the purse 
revealed some marijuana.24  
Having found the drugs, the principal went further and opened a 
zippered compartment of the purse where he found an index card with 
names on it and some letters. Upon examination, the letters revealed 
information that suggested the respondent was involved in drug 
dealing.25 After being turned over to the police, the respondent confessed 
to drug dealing and was subsequently charged as a juvenile. The charges 
were based on the evidence found by the principal and the respondent’s 
confession.26 T.L.O. claimed that she had been unlawfully searched and 
                                                
16 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643. 
17 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (“[A] search will be permissible in its scope when the 
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction.”). 
18 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643. 






25 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985). 
26 Id. at 329. 
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her confession was thus tainted by the bad search; consequently, the 
respondent moved to suppress the evidence and her confession.27 
Though holding that the Fourth Amendment applies in a public 
school setting, the Court concluded that the principal’s actions had not 
violated T.L.O.’s Fourth Amendment rights.28 The principal’s search of 
T.L.O.’s purse was reasonable because he had received a report of her 
smoking in the lavatory and her denials provided a sufficient basis to 
examine the contents of her purse.29 The discovery of the rolling papers, 
the Court held, gave rise to further suspicion that the girl was a dealer 
and justified the principal opening and reading the letters that showed 
T.L.O.’s involvement in drug dealing.30 The rolling papers gave the 
principal reasonable, individualized suspicion to look further into the 
purse and the search was thus reasonable under the circumstances.31  
The T.L.O. opinion was consistent with the Court’s move away 
from a strict in loco parentis justification in school cases involving student’s 
constitutional rights. Before T.L.O., the Court had acknowledged that the 
compulsory nature of a publicly mandated education diminishes the 
concept of in loco parentis and therefore students have First Amendment 
rights and school officials are subject to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.32 In T.L.O., the Court fashioned a balancing 
                                                
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 332-33. 
29 Id. at 345. 
30 Id. at 347. 
31 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985). 
32 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student’s right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969) (student’s right to free speech under the First Amendment). Arguably, the in loco 
parentis characterization is skewed. School administrators’ concern for a child’s welfare 
lacks the basic nurturing and protective instinct that a parent’s concern has, and instead 
carries with it the more authoritarian role of guardian. See William Buss, The Fourth 
Amendment and Searches in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 768 (1974): “One of 
the things that makes in loco parentis such an erroneous phrase in this context is 
precisely the absence of a genuinely parental protective concern for the student who is 
threatened with the school’s power. It is presumably a characteristic of the use of 
parental force against a child that the force is tempered by understanding and love based 
on a close, intimate, and permanent child-parent relationship. What so many of the 
courts persist in talking about as a parental relationship between school and student is 
really a law enforcement relationship in which the general student society is protected 
from the harms of anti-social conduct.” Moreover, the compulsory nature of school 
attendance further undermines the in loco parentis characterization. See Anne Proffitt 
Dupree, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 72 (1996): “Commentators and Courts alike have criticized 
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test based on a threshold of reasonableness—not unlike Fourth 
Amendment analysis outside the school context.33 The search, the Court 
held, must be conducted in a reasonable manner insofar as the measures 
applied reasonably relate to the objectives of the search and are not 
overly intrusive in light of the student’s circumstances.34 School searches 
must therefore meet a two-part test. First, the search must be justified at 
its inception.35 Second, the search must reasonably relate in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the search in the first place.36 The T.L.O. 
two-part test requires balancing the type of item searched, the nature of 
the infraction, and the quality of the suspicion.37 A deficiency in one of 
these can be made up by the heightened quality of another. Courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have been using the T.L.O. test with 
varying degrees of consistency ever since the case was decided.38 
While T.L.O. was a case in which individualized suspicion of a 
particular student justified the search, there are a number of cases where 
the search was premised on general concerns.39 School-wide searches of 
lockers and backpacks are increasingly routine in public schools, as is 
random drug testing.40 These searches are not targeted at any one 
                                                                                                               
the concept of parental delegation of authority in a system of compulsory education in 
which neither parent nor child has any choice in whether to attend school. The criticism 
focused on the source of the school power: ‘Under a system of compulsory education, a 
school authority is the agent of the governmental branch charged with carrying out the 
law.’” (internal citation omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court, as early as 1966, acknowledged that the parens patriae theory 
was not serving its purpose. Referring to Washington, D.C.’s juvenile court system, 
Justice Fortas wrote: “There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including that 
of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform 
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect 
to children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be 
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets 
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative 
treatment postulated for children.” Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).  
33 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335, 337. 
34 Id. at 342. 
35 Id. at 341. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 345-47. 
38 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643-44 (2009). 
39 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
40 Todd v. Rush Cnty. Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998) (testing students involved in 
extracurricular activities for drugs); Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (using metal detector to search for weapons on sixth- through twelfth-grade 
males); Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 
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individual, but instead seek to root out contraband by searching all 
students. Increased drug use, violence, or other unauthorized conduct 
usually prompts the search.41 The Court has issued a broad test to justify 
general searches. School administrators must have a basis similar to that 
for a particularized search, but must additionally show the presence of a 
“compelling governmental interest” in deterring drug use or demonstrate 
an “interest that appears important enough to justify the particular search at 
hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively 
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.”42  
Although this article’s focus is on searches of individual students, 
the rationale for allowing generalized searches bears discussion because 
that same rationale has justified searches that include random urine 
testing. Such a search might seem intrusive, but the Supreme Court 
characterizes it as an insignificant intrusion with respect to a student’s 
privacy.43  
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of suspicionless 
random drug testing of adults after government employers began to 
institute random drug testing for workers.44 When schools began to 
institute random drug testing on minors as a safety and prevention 
program in the mid-nineties, the Supreme Court weighed in on the 
practice. In Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Supreme Court upheld 
mandatory random drug testing for student athletes. Noting that the 
factors permitting a lawful search in T.L.O. were not exactly applicable to 
                                                                                                               
1988) (testing students involved in extracurricular activities for drugs); In re Dengg, 
724 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (conducting school-wide search for illicit 
contraband using drug-sniffing police canines); In re Latasha W., 60 Cal. App. 4th 
1524 (1998) (instituting random metal detector searches for weapons on campus); In re 
F.B., 658 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (conducting metal detector scans and bag 
searches of students for weapons); People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
1992) (searching students entering campus for weapons using metal detectors). 
41 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 649. 
42 Id. at 661. 
43 Although students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, 
“students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than 
members of the population generally.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985). 
44 See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) 
(holding that suspicionless drug testing for government employees applying for 
promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry 
firearms was reasonable, on balance, under Fourth Amendment); see also Skinner v. Ry 
Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding suspicionless drug and alcohol 
testing for Federal Railway Administration employees constitutional under Fourth 
Amendment).  
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circumstances involving a generalized search, the Court allowed for a 
“reasonableness” standard even in the absence of any individualized 
suspicion.45 In Vernonia School District, the drug testing was prompted by 
concerns that student athletes were highly involved in the school’s drug 
culture.46 The Court articulated a new test loosening the requirement of 
individualized suspicion where governmental interests outweigh the level 
of intrusion. The Court set out three factors to consider in applying the 
balancing test: 1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search 
at issue intrudes; 2) the character of the intrusion; and 3) the nature and 
immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy of the means 
utilized to address that concern.47 
In Board of Education of Independent School District v. Earls, the 
Supreme Court upheld a school board mandate that required all students 
participating in extracurricular activities to submit to random drug 
testing.48 The method of urine collection was not deemed to be a 
particularly intrusive exercise because the school monitor waited outside 
the bathroom stall listening for normal sounds of urination. Further, the 
results of the tests were used for only limited purposes.49 Although in 
Earls the Court discussed the other prongs of the Vernonia School District 
three-part test, the compelling governmental interest factor was the most 
influential in the Court’s analysis.50 The Court cited statistics relating to 
drug abuse in schools nationally and gave that data as much weight as the 
testimony regarding the school’s problem (which was described as “not 
major”).51 
Whether a search is based on individualized or generalized 
suspicion, it is always evaluated within the unique context of a student’s 
privacy interests and the school’s need to maintain order and discipline, 
along with a school’s responsibility for the safety of its students.52 In 
                                                
45 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646, 653-53 (1995). 
46 Id. at 649. 
47 Id. at 656-60. 
48 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 826-28 (2002). 
49 Results were not placed in students’ files and once they had a positive test, there were 
still given several chances before they were taken out of the activity. Id. at 832-34.  
50 Id. at 834-36. 
51 Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
52 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009); Earls, 
536 U.S. at 830; Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (“The 
reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility 
for children.”). 
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either case, the degree of suspicion must increase substantially to justify 
searches that are more personally intrusive.  
Returning for a moment to the image of the public school child 
entering school wearing a coat and carrying her backpack, her zone of 
expected privacy becomes greater the closer the item is to her body. 
Thus, a student’s privacy interest in her locker is minimal.53 To begin 
with, lockers are school property, and school districts often have policies 
that specifically state that a student has no privacy interest in his or her 
locker.54 To the extent that lockers are repositories for private items like 
purses or jackets, courts recognize a student’s heightened expectation of 
privacy concerning those items, as opposed to the locker itself.55 Such 
items are recognized as more private and thus more individualized 
suspicion is required prior to a search.56  
Pockets, backpacks, and purses—items that are part of a 
student’s clothing or carried by students—are subject to stiffer guidelines 
in terms of a search.57 Where school administrators have specific 
information regarding a student’s possession or use of drugs or weapons, 
a search of their pockets, backpacks, or purses is likely permissible.58 On 
the other hand, an anonymous tip or rumor is likely insufficient for a 
search of a student’s personal belongings or pockets because the 
information prompting the search lacks the level of particularization that 
would warrant an intrusion of belongings being worn or carried by the 
student.59 For example, in a Pennsylvania case, a vice principal’s search of 
a student’s purse that was based on anonymous tips of her possible 
possession of a marijuana pipe was held unlawful.60 
However, even in cases where the source of information is 
anonymous, if the tip includes information about weapon possession, 
dangerous drug distribution, or other facts that pose a risk to student and 
                                                
53 Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 357 (Pa. 1998). 
54 State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Iowa 2003); see In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405, 
414 (Md. 2000); see also Shoemaker v. State, 971 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App. 1998); 
In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993) (where school policies specifically 
disclaimed students’ privacy right for the contents of their lockers). 
55 Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 148. 
56 In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d 1100, 1108 (Ohio 1997). 
57 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
58 See, e.g., State v. Drake, 139 N.H. 662, 667 (1995) (pockets and backpacks); Matter 
of Gregory M., 627 N.E.2d 500, 582 (N.Y. 1993) (backpacks). 
59 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d at 688-89; see also Texas v. K.C.B., 141 S.W.3d 303, 309 
(2004) (finding that the possible presence of drugs on a student does not warrant 
searching a student’s undergarments when the suspicion is based on an anonymous tip). 
60 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d at 689. 
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faculty safety, courts are likely to uphold the search.61 Despite the 
increased intrusiveness, the court will tip the balance in favor of the 
school’s interest in promoting and protecting a safe environment for 
school children.62 
If a student’s lack of expected privacy in a locker is at one end of 
the spectrum, searches that involve the body are at the opposite end. 
Searches by school administrators that expose a student’s body require a 
high degree of particularized suspicion.63 The one notable exception 
involves searches of students engaged in athletics or co-curricular 
activities who are allowed somewhat less privacy than other students.64 In 
Vernonia School District, the Supreme Court upheld the urine testing of 
student athletes, partly because those students were said to be 
accustomed to a certain degree of exposure because they “suited up” in 
the locker room, and followed rules that required physical exams.65  
Seven year later, in Earls, the Supreme Court seemed to cast aside 
its “athletes are different” reasoning when it expanded authorization for 
suspicionless drug testing to all students involved in co-curricular 
activities.66 Claiming that their decision in Vernonia School District did not 
rely heavily on the fact that athletes are subject to decreased privacy, the 
Court in Earls found that students involved in any extracurricular activity 
were subject to communal undress and “off-campus travel” and 
therefore, their expectation of privacy was limited.67 In both Vernonia 
School District and Earls, the Court found that the level of intrusion (a 
monitor in a bathroom listening for the sounds of normal urination) was 
                                                
61 Thomson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004) (weapon 
possession); In re Cody S., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 655-56 (Ct. App. 2004) (weapon 
possession); In re Boykin, 237 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 1968) (weapon possession). 
62 See, e.g., In re Cody S., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655-56. 
63 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); see also Phanuef v. 
Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2006) (unreasonable strip search of student’s under 
garments for marijuana); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 605 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (unlawful strip search of male and female students for stolen money); 
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (blood test and urinalysis for 
suspected drug use); Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 
824 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (strip search for suspected theft); Cornfield ex rel. Lewis 
v. Consol. High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d 1316, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (strip search for 
suspected drug sales); Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (search of student’s person for suspected drug use). 
64 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 831-32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657. 
65 Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32. 
66 Id. at 831. 
67 Id. at 832. 
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minimal and the governmental interest high.68 In fact, the Court in Earls 
seemed to back away entirely from any requirement of a real 
governmental interest, holding that a “demonstrated problem of drug 
abuse . . . [is] not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing 
regime.”69 Instead, the Court allowed for a showing that simply “shores 
up”—a standard that appears to be decidedly vague—a special need for a 
suspicionless search.70 
In its most recent foray into the schoolyard, the Supreme Court 
pulled back from its earlier decisions, acknowledging that students have a 
privacy zone that must be protected.71 In Safford United School District v. 
Redding, the Supreme Court held that a strip search of a student accused 
of hiding “contraband” Ibuprofen went too far.72 The student was 
suspected of dispersing prescription drugs to other students so 
administrators searched her bra and had her open her pants.73 No pills 
were found. The Court held that the search at its inception was justified 
because the principal had heard that the student was distributing pills to 
students.74 However, the scope of the ultimate search was found to be 
not reasonably related to the circumstances.75 
The Court believed that school officials in Redding had sufficient 
suspicion to warrant a search of the young girl’s backpack and outer 
clothing. There was ample evidence she had been involved in pill 
distribution. The search of her outer clothing and backpack were 
therefore not excessively intrusive. However, the Court held that pulling 
away the young girl’s underwear went beyond the bounds of an 
appropriate search given the circumstances.76 Although the school 
officials testified that they did not, in fact, see anything when the girl 
pulled away her underwear, the Court held that the very possibility of 
exposure was enough to trigger a Fourth Amendment violation.77 What 
justified this finding were “subjective and reasonable societal 
expectations of personal privacy.”78 The level of intrusion was unrelated 
to the reason for the search; that is, the grounds for the search—non-
                                                
68 Id. at 832-34. 
69 Id. at 835. 
70 Id. 
71 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009). 
72 Id. at 2642-43. 
73 Id. at 2642. 
74 Id. at 2642-43. 
75 Id. at 2642. 
76 Id.  
77 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009). 
78 Id. at 2641. 
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dangerous contraband—did not warrant such an intrusive search.79 The 
Court also took issue with the lack of particularized suspicion that the 
girl actually had drugs on her person. Without clear information that 
drugs were being secreted on the girl’s body or other indication of actual 
danger, the Court held the search was inappropriate under the 
circumstances.80  
The Court acknowledged in Redding that societal norms and 
expectations contribute to an assessment of the expectation of privacy.81 
Indeed, the Court went so far as to make a distinction between a 
student’s exposure in a locker room—something students are 
accustomed to and therefore considered less invasive—and exposure for 
the sake of a search, which is understood to be more intrusive because it 
is not within a student’s ordinary experience.82 In short, the Court found 
that adolescents’ perceptions about exposing their bodies and their 
vulnerability due to natural self-consciousness demand particular 
protection.83  
A. Defining	  What	  Is	  “Private”	  	  
Permitting school searches that are reasonably related in scope 
and not “excessively intrusive in light of age and sex of the student”84 
leads to the question—what does “intrusive” in this context mean? In 
                                                
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2643. 
81 In a very recent case, United States v Jones, the Court held that placing a GPS device 
under a suspect’s car without a warrant constituted a search that violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Scalia’ s opinion based the violation on the police officer’s physical 
intrusion of a protected area—a trespassory intrusion. The Court divided on Scalia’s 
approach to the analysis, not the ultimate holding. Scalia did not apply an “expectation 
of privacy analysis,” focusing instead on a property analysis. In her concurring opinion, 
Justice Sotomayor addressed the privacy analysis and noted that the particular attributes 
of the GPS should be taken into account: “I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
911, 957 (2012). 
82 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009). See 
generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479). 
83 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. See generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479). 
84 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). 
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other words, what is a reasonable expectation of privacy for a high 
school student?85  
Expectation of privacy analysis measures both an individual’s 
subjective view and society’s objective view of what is reasonable.86 
Applying the subjective standard to a teenager poses a unique difficultly 
because, at least outwardly, a teenager’s definition of what is private is a 
moving target.87 If establishing the line for teenagers’ subjective 
expectations of privacy were based on the type of information most 
teens post online or communicate via cell phone, the line might not exist 
at all. However, assuming that the type of private information that a teen 
is willing to put out electronically is an indication of what they believe is 
private is a mistake.88 One study that compared social media privacy 
settings between teens and adults found little variation indicating, as least 
                                                
85 Bill O. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public School, 1999 
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 71, 81 (1999) (“The test for subjective and socially acceptable 
privacy expectations places immense discretionary and interpretive burdens upon the 
courts.”). 
86 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz has since been adopted as the test applicable to Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
87 Leary, supra note 9, at 1043-44. 
88 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 404, 406 (1974) (“Because we are accustomed to having something 
approaching absolute privacy when we lock our outer doors, we tend to conceive of 
privacy as an absolute phenomenon and to denigrate the importance of degrees of 
privacy. To us it seems intuitively evident that anything a person does within sight or 
hearing of his neighbors or the general public is not private—and that, as to such things, 
it makes no difference whether they are observed by a neighbor or a policeman—
because we retire to our homes when we want real privacy. But if you live in a cheap 
hotel or in a ghetto flat, your neighbors can hear you breathing quietly even in 
temperate weather when it is possible to keep the windows and the doors closed. For the 
tenement dweller, the difference between observation by neighbors and visitors who 
ordinarily use the common hallways and observation by policemen who come into the 
hallways to ‘check up’ or ‘look around’ is the difference between all the privacy that his 
condition allows and none. Is that small difference too unimportant to claim fourth 
amendment [sic] protection? I myself do not think so, but the difficulty of making 
judgments of this sort and embodying them in administrable rules is evident.”); see also 
Alice E. Marwick et al., Youth, Privacy and Reputation, 13 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & 
Soc’y, Research Publ’n No. 2010-5, 2010; Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 
10-29, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1588163##; Danh Boyd et al., Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes, 
Practices, and Strategies, A DECADE IN INTERNET TIME: SYMPOSIUM ON THE 
DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIETY, Sept. 22, 2011, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925128.  
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in this limited study, that teens and adults share similar concerns about 
privacy.89 
Teens are, by definition and developmental stage, risk-takers.90 
Most adolescents do not have the capacity to think through the results of 
their actions. Thus, what they choose to put on their phones or publicize 
through social media should not serve as any kind of gauge of what they 
consider private.91 The exhibitionist tendencies of teens probably have 
more to do with social norms and lack of maturity than any kind of 
renunciation of what they think should be private. If teenagers are in 
some sense unreasonable by nature, it might seem impossible to judge 
what is reasonable based on their behavior.  
How, then, do we measure a teenager’s subjective expectation of 
privacy? In Redding, Justice Souter tried to address this conundrum by 
considering the student’s own subjective account of being embarrassed, 
humiliated, and frightened after a school administrator instructed the 
student to pull out her bra and the elastic on her pants.92 Souter also 
applied a “semi-objective” measure, holding that “the reasonableness of 
her expectation (required by the Fourth Amendment standard) is 
indicated by the consistent experience of other young people similarly 
searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the 
exposure.”93 This standard suggests the need to take into account the level 
of intrusiveness as it feels to a typical adolescent, rather than to a 
“reasonable” person.94 By this reasoning, establishing how intrusive a cell 
                                                
89 Researchers conducting a study for the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American 
Life Project compared privacy settings on social media sites of teens and adults. The 
study demonstrated no significant variation in the settings of teens and their adult 
counterparts. Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/ 
PIP_Privacy_management_on_social_media_sites_022412.pdf. 
90 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty as applied to 
juveniles under eighteen is cruel and unusual punishment. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
The Court based its ruling, in part, on research showing the immature, impulsive, and 
poor decision-making skills of adolescents. Id. 
91 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When it 
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? (Apr. 14, 2019), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864. This study collected and compared data from several 
age groups, the youngest of which was eighteen to twenty-four. The report concluded 
that young adults may share personal data not because they lack concern for their 
privacy, but because sharing their own data is a means of maintaining their social 
connections and adhering to social norms. 
92 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009). 
93 Id. (emphasis added). 
94 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a 
child-suspect’s age is relevant to whether they are in custody for Miranda purposes. In 
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phone search is to a teenager is essential to setting appropriate limits on 
those searches. 
B. What	  Do	  Teens	  Do	  with	  Their	  Cell	  Phones?	  
In 1973, when mobile phones were first invented, they were large 
cumbersome devices,95 weighing nearly two-and-a-half pounds.96 Today, 
advances in technology have led to cell phones and smart phones that are 
tiny,97 contain a wealth of information, and are used as a regular means of 
communication, particularly among teenagers.98 Smart phones, in 
particular, are a gateway to documents, passwords, Internet sites, and 
countless “apps”—all of which are reflections of, or extensions of, the 
student’s life.  
Research confirms that cell phones are now virtual appendages of 
teenagers. In a 2010 study, the Pew Research Center reported on 
comprehensive data about text messaging and teens.99 Most teens send 
roughly fifty text messages a day, or fifteen hundred texts a month.100 
Cell phones have become the primary mode of communication for 
people aged twelve to seventeen.101  
                                                                                                               
her opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the Miranda analysis is an objective 
one that asks whether a “reasonable” person in the suspect’s position would perceive 
that he or she was in custody. However, accounting for how a child perceives the 
situation is appropriate because what is reasonable to a child may not be reasonable to 
an adult. “In fact, in many cases involving juvenile suspects, the custody analysis would 
be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect’s age. This case is a prime 
example. Were the court precluded from taking J. D. B.’s youth into account, it would 
be forced to evaluate the circumstances present here through the eyes of a reasonable 
person of average years. In other words, how would a reasonable adult understand his 
situation, after being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a uniformed 
school resource officer; being encouraged by his assistant principal to ‘do the right 
thing’; and being warned by a police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention 
and separation from his guardian and primary caretaker? To describe such an inquiry is 
to demonstrate its absurdity. Neither officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the 
effect of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without 
accounting for the age of the child subjected to those circumstances.” Id. at 2405. 
95 Gerald Goggin, CELL PHONE CULTURE 20 (2006). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Lenhart, supra note 8. 
100 Id. at 31. 
101 Id. at 9. (Not surprisingly, “[w]ireless communication has emerged as one of the 
fastest diffusing media on the planet,” giving birth to a “mobile youth culture”).  
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In the Pew survey, many teens reported that they send text 
messages several times a day to exchange information privately and to 
have long conversations to discuss personal matters. Nearly three-
quarters of teens said their texts contain “personal matters.”102 When 
asked, teens indicated that the cell phone is a “bonding resource.”103 
Teens naturally use their phones for more than just texting and 
calling.104 Of the seventy-five percent of teens who own cell phones, the 
majority uses their phones to take pictures and share those pictures with 
other teens.105 Other uses include playing music, playing games, 
exchanging videos, instant messaging, using the Internet, accessing social 
network sites, and using email.106  
When it comes to using cell phones in schools, about two-thirds 
of teens said that they attend a school where they are allowed to have 
their phone with them, but are not allowed to use the phone in class.107 
Only a quarter said that they attend a school where they are not allowed 
to have cell phones at all.108 Of teens that attend schools where 
classroom use is forbidden, some teens talked of teachers’ own policies 
for keeping cell phone use to a minimum.109 For example, one high 
school student described a teacher who collects cell phones at the 
beginning of each class and returns them to students when class ends.110 
Another student described a teacher who will take a phone from an 
offending student and read the message out loud to the entire class.111  
II. CURRENT	   APPLICATION	   OF	   FOURTH	   AMENDMENT	   TO	   CELL	  
PHONES	  
In general, courts recognize that users have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the content-based information on their cell 
phones.112 Cell phones contain a “wealth of private information” such as 
                                                
102 Id. at 55.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 5. 
105 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 5. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 81. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 82. 
110 Id. 
111 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 82. 
112 Courts distinguish between “content-based” information and “coding” information. 
Content-based information consists of the subject matter of communications and stored 
data. Coding information consists of identifying or tracking information. See United 
States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating 
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recent-call lists, emails, text messages, and photographs.113 A cell phone’s 
ability to store this large amount of private information “gives users a 
reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the 
information they contain.”114 Because cell phone users typically have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in their phone’s contents, a search 
warrant is required for a search unless an exception to the warrant 
requirement exists.115 One such exception is the automobile exception, 
which allows police to search items inside a car that are within reach of 
an unsecured driver.116  
When the issue of cell phone searches first arose, lower federal 
and state courts often evaluated cell phone searches in reference to either 
the “search incident to arrest” or automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. In such instances, courts used the analogy that cell phones 
are “closed containers”117 similar to a purse or wallet. For example, in the 
2005 case United States v. Cote, the federal district court in Northern 
Illinois reasoned that a cell phone is analogous to a wallet or an address 
book because it holds similar information.118 Because searches of wallets 
and address books had been allowed in past cases under the “incident to 
arrest” exception, the Illinois court held, without significant reasoning, 
that the same standard should apply to cell phones.119 In a 2007 case, 
United States v. Finley, the court upheld, with no reasoning, a search of the 
                                                                                                               
Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 
(5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (D. Fla. 
2009); Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1083 (Conn. 2010); Ohio v. Smith, 920 
N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).  
113 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (citing Zavala, 541 F.3d at 577). 
114 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955. 
115 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1299. Police officers that make a lawful arrest do not 
need a warrant to conduct a search incident to that arrest as long as the search is for 
evidence of the arrestee’s crime. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); New York 
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
116 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
117 Finley, 477 F.3d at 260; United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2008); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 
1925032, at *4 (E.D. Mo. April 29, 2008); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 
(1991) (holding that police may search an automobile and the containers within it where 
they have probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband is contained); New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that police may search containers, whether 
open or closed, located within arrestee’s reach as a valid search incident to arrest). 
118 Cote, 2005 WL 1323343 at *6. 
119 Id.; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a 
wallet and address book are part of a valid search incident to arrest). 
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defendant’s cell phone contents because it was pursuant to an arrest.120 
Other similar cases offered limited reasoning or no reasoning at all, 
instead simply finding that cell phones are containers.121  
Other courts have recognized that cell phones are unique 
repositories that contain extensive personal information and therefore 
require different treatment. In U.S. v. Park, a federal district court in 
Northern California held that a search of the defendant’s cell phone went 
“far beyond the original rationales for searches incident to arrest.”122 In 
this 2007 case, the court also noted that the search was not conducted to 
preserve evidence or to ensure officer safety.123 Cell phones, the court 
said, are not like pagers or address books; unlike those items, cell phones 
store an “immense amount of private information” including “incoming 
and outgoing calls, address books, calendars, voice and text messages, 
email, video, and pictures.”124 Information contained in modern 
electronic storage devices “renders a search of their contents 
substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox 
or other tangible object.”125 The court did not explicitly address the cell-
phone-as-container theory, but it embraced the alternate view that cell 
phones are unique instruments whose private contents are such that 
searches need to meet the higher standard applicable to a personal 
computer.126  
Similarly, in Ohio v. Smith, a 2009 case, police searched a 
suspected drug dealer’s cell phone after his arrest.127 The court disagreed 
                                                
120 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007). 
121 See United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (citing Belton 
and Finley to hold that police can search any “container” in a vehicle—and that includes 
cell phones); see also United States v. Fierros-Alvarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1214 (D. 
Kan. 2008) (stating that courts usually will not “suspend general Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence on exceptions to the search warrant requirement simply because the 
container is a cellular telephone phone”); Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1088-
89 (Conn. 2010) (“When the automobile exception applies, police may also search 
closed containers located within the automobile . . . even if it’s a cell phone”); James, 
2008 WL 1925032 at *4; People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011) (holding that 
police lawfully searched contents of cell phone found on a defendant’s person incident 
to arrest because the phone was “immediately associated with the defendant’s person”). 
122 No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
123 Id.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.; see also United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 8, 2008).  
126 Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009). 
127 Id. 
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with the holdings in Finley and other prior Ohio cases when it announced 
that cell phones are not closed containers for the purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.128 The court reasoned that in Belton the U.S. 
Supreme Court defined “container” as “any object capable of holding 
another object.”129 Such a definition “implies that the container must 
actually have a physical object within it.”130 The Ohio court made the 
distinction that, although cell phones may be said to “contain” 
information, they do not in fact contain anything physical.131 Treating 
them as containers is therefore based merely on a semantic coincidence 
and does not recognize their special capabilities as repositories of 
personal information. “Even the more basic models of modern cell 
phones” are capable of storing an abundance of electronic information 
“wholly unlike any physical object found within a closed container.”132 
After establishing that cell phones are not containers, the court went on 
to promulgate a new standard for cell phone searches incident to arrest: 
once police seize a cell phone found during an arrest, they have satisfied 
their immediate interest in collecting and preserving evidence. Any 
further search of the phone’s highly private contents must only be 
conducted with a warrant.133  
A. 	  How	  Are	  Courts	  Ruling	  on	  Current	  Public	  School	  
Policies?	  
While cell phones have certainly increased the speed and ease of 
useful communication and coordination, the growing number of school 
students who bring phones to school has sparked a variety of problems. 
Students may text during class, use their phones to cheat on exams, bully 
their peers, arrange illegal drug sales, and conspire to flout school 
regulations.134 Even when schools ban cell phones, almost two-thirds of 
                                                
128 Id. at 954. 
129 Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)). 
130 Id. See United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that 
a pager is a closed container); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(agreeing with Chan). 
131 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955. 
132 Id. at 954. 
133 Id. at 955. Contra Fawdry v. State, No. 1D10–0896, 2011 WL 1815328, *3 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (disagreeing with the Smith court, holding that the digital 
information contained in a cell phone fits the description of objects found in a closed 
container, albeit in an intangible form).  
134 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 1, 5, 9; Zach Miners, One Third of Teens Use Cellphones to 
Cheat in School, U.S. NEWS – ON EDUCATION BLOG (June 23, 2009), 
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students at such “no phone” schools bring them anyway.135 
Compounding the problem, parents do not always support school 
administrators seeking to control cell phone use. In 2007, for example, 
parents of New York City public school students sued the school 
department after it banned cell phones at school.136 One basis for the 
court’s opinion siding with the schools was that students simply do not 
have the maturity or self-control to resist use, and thus enforcement of a 
limited use policy would be too difficult.137 
Schools often address the problem by instituting confiscation 
policies.138 Some schools go further and sanction searches of cell phones 
once they are confiscated.139 When such policies exist, courts have 
                                                                                                               
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/on-education/2009/06/23/one-third-of-teens-
use-cellphones-to-cheat-in-school. 
135 Id. at 83. 
136 Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 837 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 2007), aff’d 855 
N.Y.S.2d 530 (App. Div. 2008). 
137 Id. at 519. 
138 A typical confiscation policy: “Students are not permitted to use or have a cell phone 
in sight upon arrival on campus. Students are allowed to use their cell phone for 
reasonable communication purposes in or out of the building after dismissal. If students 
are found using a cell phone or if a cell phone is seen or heard during the previously stated 
school hours, the cell phone will be confiscated and turned over to the school administration. 
For after school activities, the use of such devices shall be at the discretion of the activity 
sponsor.” Bedford County Schools, Cell Phone Policy (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.bedfordk12tn.com/education/components/scrapbook/default.php?sectio
ndetailid=9452; see also Boston Public Schools, Guide to the Boston Public Schools 51 
(2010), available at http://www.bostonpublicschools.org/files/bps_guide_12_ 
english.pdf; Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Schools, Code of Conduct 9 (2011), 
available at http://www.cms.k12.nc.us/parents/resources/Documents/CODEOF 
CONDUCT2011ENG.pdf; Detroit Public Schools, Rights and Responsibilities of 
Students in the Detroit Public Schools 15-16 (2011), available at http://detroitk12.org/ 
resources/students/codeOfConduct/Student_Code_of_Conduct.pdf.  
139 Sharon Salyer, Mukilteo Schools May Check Students’ Cell Phones, HERALDNET, Jan. 
24, 2011, available at http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20110124/NEWS01/ 
701249945; Marlee Ginter, District Ponders Subjecting Students to Cell Phone Search, 
KOMO NEWS, Aug. 16, 2010, available at http://www.komonews.com/ 
news/local/100809309.htm; Katie McVicker, Checking for Sexting: Oak Harbor School 
Board Policy Would Let School Officials Search Students’ Cell Phones, WHIDBEY NEWS-
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, available at http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/whidbey/ 
wnt/news/100655619.html; Tony Marerro, Hernando Schools Students’ Cell Phones Can 
Be Searched, Board Says, TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 5, 2010, available at 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/hernando-schools-students-cell-
phones-can-be-searched-board-says/1092539; Lanie Barron, Yes, They Can Read Your 
Texts, ERNEST W. SEAHOLM HIGHLANDER, Sept. 16, 2008, available at 
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authorized searches of confiscated phones where there is reasonable 
suspicion of a school rule violation or violation of law.140 However, such 
searches are being challenged with greater frequency.141  
The courts have responded to the growing number of challenges 
to student cell phones searches by applying the T.L.O. two-step 
approach: first, examining the justification for the search, and next, 
deciding whether the scope of the search was reasonable.142 While courts 
are willing to find that the searches are justified in their inception, they 
are less willing to allow school officials to search the content of a phone. 
For example, in 2006, the federal district court in Pennsylvania took up 
the issue in Klump v. Nazareth Area School District. In Klump, a teacher 
confiscated a student’s cell phone after it fell out of his pocket, pursuant 
to a school policy prohibiting the use or display of cell phones.143 Once it 
was taken away, school officials accessed the student’s text messages and 
voice mail and called nine numbers listed in the student’s contact list to 
see if the students would violate cell phone policy by answering their 
phones.144 The school officials also engaged in a text message 
conversation with the student’s younger brother.145 At some point a text 
was received from the student’s girlfriend that read, “Get me a ***in 
tampon”146—an apparent reference to a large marijuana cigarette.147  
                                                                                                               
http://seaholmhighlander.com/community/seaholm-high-school/250-yes-they-can-read-
your-texts; Leonard Glenn Crist, Board Passes Cell Phone Policy, SALEMNEWS.NET, June 
13, 2008, available at http://www.salemnews.net/page/content.detail/id/502774/Board-
passes-cell-phone-policy.html. 
140 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
15, 2011). See also ACLU of California, Hello! Students Have a Right to Privacy in Their 
Cell Phones: Indiscriminate Cell Phone Searches Violate Students’ Privacy Rights (Sept. 
2011), available at http://www.aclusandiego.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/H-
E-L-L-O-student-cell-phone-rights.pdf; Authority to Seize Students’ Cell Phones, Op. 
Va. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.ag.virginia.gov/ 
Opinions%20and%20Legal%20Resources/Opinions/2010opns/10-105-Bell.pdf. 
141 See, e.g., Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 22 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 15, 2011); J.W. v. DeSoto County Sch. Dist., 2:09-CV-00155-MPM, 2010 
WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010); N.N. v. Tunkahannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 
F. Supp. 2d 312 (M.D. Penn. 2011). 
142 Bernard James, Safe Schools, Cell Phones, and the Fourth Amendment, NASRO J. OF 
SCH. SAFETY, Winter 2009, available at http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/ 
faculty/publications/James-NASROCellPhoneLaw.pdf. 
143 Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (E.D. Penn. 2006). 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 631. 
147 Id. 
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The student in Klump sued the school claiming violations of state 
and federal wiretap laws, invasion of privacy, and Fourth Amendment 
violations.148 The school moved to dismiss the claims, countering, among 
other things, that it was not subject to a Fourth Amendment claim under 
immunity laws that shielded state officials from certain kinds of federal 
lawsuits.149  
The Klump court denied the school’s motions to dismiss.150 
Applying T.L.O.’s two-part test, the court found that seizing the phone 
was justified at its inception because the student had violated a school 
rule.151 However, school officials were not justified in searching the 
contents of the phone, nor was it permissible to use the phone as a tool 
to stimulate additional violations of school policy. School officials had no 
reason to think that the student was transgressing school policy at the 
time of the confiscation.152 The court therefore disallowed the search 
because the text about drug activity was not apparent to officials until 
after they initiated the search of the phone.153 
Similarly, in a 2010 Texas case, Mendoza v. Klein Independent School 
District, a teacher confiscated an eighth grader’s phone after observing 
her looking at it with some friends.154 Because of the students’ guilty 
reactions when they were confronted, the teacher inferred that they were 
probably looking at something inappropriate for a school setting.155 The 
teacher took the phone, searched through sent text messages, and found 
nude photos of the student.156 The student confessed that she had sent 
the photos to her boyfriend because he had sent similar photos to her.157 
The student was suspended and assigned to a disciplinary program.158 She 
subsequently sued the school for violating her Fourth Amendment rights 
                                                
148 Id. 
149 Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 640 (E.D. Penn. 2006) 
(qualified immunity protects public officials from lawsuits brought under the 
Constitution unless the conduct violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable 
person would have been aware). 
150 Id. at 638. 
151 Id. at 640. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
15, 2011). 
155 Id. at 3. 
156 Id. at 3-4.  
157 Id. at 4. 
158 Id. at 5-6. 
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and for intentional infliction of emotional harm.159 Like the Klump 
defendant, the school in this case claimed immunity from liability under 
state law, thus triggering review of the Fourth Amendment constitutional 
claim.160 
In Mendoza, the court found that the search was justified at its 
inception because the student had claimed she was not using the phone, 
but the teacher’s observations suggested otherwise.161 Accordingly, the 
teacher was justified in checking to see if the student had violated school 
policy by sending a text during school.162 However, the court denied the 
school’s motion for summary judgment, holding that a jury could find 
that opening the texts on the phone was not reasonably related to the 
initial justification for searching the phone.163  
By contrast, in J.W. v. DeSoto County School District, a twelve-year-
old boy was expelled from school in 2008 for suspected gang activity 
after his cell phone, confiscated for in-class use, was found to contain a 
picture of a friend holding what turned out to be a BB gun, and other 
pictures depicting alleged gang clothing.164 The student sued the 
Mississippi school district claiming that he was unlawfully expelled, and 
the case came before the court on the issue of whether searching the 
phone violated clearly established law, thereby foreclosing the school’s 
immunity from suit.165 The court found that the search of the student’s 
cell phone was not unlawful because the student had brought it to school 
and used it against school rules. These acts diminished the student’s 
expectations of privacy.166 The DeSoto court distinguished the case from 
Klump, describing the Pennsylvania school’s search as a veritable “fishing 
expedition” into the student’s personal life.167 Here, the court said, the 
Mississippi school’s actions were “limited” to only looking at the 
student’s photos.168 The case was settled in February 2011.169  
                                                
159 Id. at 7-8. 
160 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 
15, 2011); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.0511 (West 2006). 
161 Mendoza, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011). 
162 Id. at 22-23. 
163 Id. at 27. 
164 2:09-CV-00155-MPM, 2010 WL 4394059, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at *5. 
168 Id. 
169 Press Release, ACLU, Mississippi School District to Clarify Gang Policy as Part of 
Settlement of ACLU Lawsuit (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/racial-
justice/mississippi-school-district-clarify-gang-policy-part-settlement-aclu-lawsuit.  
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The ACLU has also taken up the issue of cell phone searches. In 
2007, the ACLU stepped into a dispute at a Colorado school district.170 
School administrators had been taking cell phones after minor infractions 
and then reading the texts—a practice that had been authorized by the 
school district’s legal counsel.171 The ACLU argued that the searches 
violated state law as well as the Fourth Amendment.172 In response, the 
school district agreed to limit its practice and instituted new rules that 
require administrators to get student or parental permission before 
searching a cell phone unless there is an imminent threat to public 
safety.173  
The ACLU of California made a similar complaint to a California 
school district in 2008 after a school administrator confiscated a 
student’s phone while he was talking to his mother.174 The administrator 
allegedly accessed three weeks of prior texts messages that included 
personal communications with the student’s mother.175 Pursuant to the 
ACLU’s action, the school administration agreed that school officials 
would not search the text messages of confiscated cell phones unless 
they had a reasonable suspicion of a violation of law or school rules. The 
new policy also limited the scope of the search to information pertaining 
directly to the alleged infraction that led to the seizure of the phone.176  
In 2010, the ACLU of Pennsylvania sued a school district after a 
school principal scrolled through a student’s phone and found “explicit” 
photos, which he turned over to law enforcement.177 The case was settled 
                                                
170 See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Bd. of Educ., Boulder Valley Sch. 




173 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Boulder Valley School District’s Decision to 
Limit Searches of Students’ Cell Phone Text Messages (Apr. 21, 2008), available at 
http://aclu-co.org/news/aclu-applauds-boulder-valley-school-district%E2%80%99s-
decision-to-limit-searches-of-students%E2%80%99-cell-pho. 
174 Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Linden Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. 
(Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/youth/3-
03-08_aclu_ltr_to_linden_school_district.pdf. 
175 Id. 
176 Press Release, ACLU, School District Changes Its Unconstitutional Cell Phone 
Search Policy (Apr. 16, 2008), available at http://www.aclunc.org/cases/other_legal 
_advocacy/school_district_changes_its_unconstitutional_cell_phone_search_policy.sht
ml?ht=. 
177 Complaint, N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 2d 312 (M.D. Pa. May 
20, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01080). 
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with the school agreeing to pay the plaintiff $33,000178 and to formulate 
better guidelines on cell phone searches.179  
As the courts grapple with how to apply the reasonableness test 
to searches of student cell phones, schools are struggling to cope with 
the implications of widespread cell phone ownership and student use. 
Outright bans appear to be of little practical use, as phones can readily be 
concealed.180 Confiscation-for-use policies are the norm, but the 
circumstances governing how school officials can search confiscated cell 
phones and the manner in which they do so are still unsettled. As 
previously noted, students do not enjoy the same level of Fourth 
Amendment protection as other people, so searches of their cell phones 
have fallen into a gray zone that begs for clearer definition. The 
increasing pace of student versus school litigation and the more frequent 
involvement of the ACLU suggest that some definitive resolution of this 
question is not far off.181 
III. CELL	  PHONE	  SEARCHES	  SHOULD	  REQUIRE	  A	  SEARCH	  WARRANT	  
                                                
178 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Settles Student-Cell-Phone-Search Lawsuit With 
Northeast Pennsylvania School District (Sep. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/pressroom/aclusettlesstudentcellphon.htm. 
179 Id. 
180 A Pennsylvania school banned students from wearing Uggs to school because they 
were secreting cell phones inside the boots instead of following school policy and leaving 
the phones in their lockers. PA Middle School Bans Ugg Boots, NEWSY.COM, Jan. 30, 
2012, http://www.newsy.com/videos/pa-middle-school-bans-ugg-boots/. 
181 Eric, Stevick, Mukilteo Schools OK Rules on Cell Phones, THE DAILY HERALD, Jan. 
24, 2011, available at www.heraldnet.com/article/20110125/NEWS01/701259800; 
Katie McVicker, ACLU Hits Proposed Oak Harbor High School Cell Phone Policy, 
WHIDBEY NEWS TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/ 
default/article/ACLU-hits-proposed-Oak-Harbor-High-School-cell-887073.php; 
Katherine Leal Unmuth, Irving School Board Supports Decision to Search Student's 
Cell Phone Text Messages Dallas School District,  DALLAS NEWS – IRVING BLOG (Aug. 
3, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://irvingblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2010/08/post-7.html; 
Lanie Barron, Yes, They Can Read Your Texts, SEAHOLM HIGHLANDER, Sept. 16, 
2008, available at http://seaholmhighlander.com/community/seaholm-high-
school/250-yes-they-can-read-your-texts; Brenda Pedraza-Vidamour, Schools Can Search 
Cell Phones, NEWNAN TIMES HERALD, Sept. 6, 2008, available at http://www.times-
herald.com/education/Schools-can-search-cell-phones--541309; Leonard Glenn Crist, 
Board Passes Cell Phone Policy, SALEM NEWS, June 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.salemnews.net/page/content.detail/id/502774/Board-passes-cell-phone-
policy.html. The Virginia Attorney General issued an advisory opinion on November 
24, 2010 stating that “reasonable suspicion” is the applicable standard regarding 
whether school officials can search student’s cell phones. Op. Va. Att’y Gen., supra 
note 140. 
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Most schools appear to adhere to a “reasonable suspicion” 
standard with respect to cell phone searches when they suspect that a law 
or school policy has been broken. However, it is not always clear what 
types of evidence justify reasonable suspicion. For example, if a student 
is caught texting in class, that in itself is a violation of school policy and 
clearly justifies confiscation, but does the conduct justify a search of the 
cell phone? “Reasonable suspicion” is a standard applied by police as 
justification for a “Terry” stop—a stop-and-frisk of an individual 
suspected of criminal activity.182 In this context, “reasonable suspicion” 
means that a “police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”183 Whether reasonable 
suspicion exists will depend on the “totality of the circumstances” and 
the officer’s own experience and expertise.184 Courts sanction this lesser 
standard because, though circumstances warrant some intrusion given 
officer safety or crime prevention concerns, the intrusion to the 
individual is correspondingly minimal when compared to a full-blown 
arrest or search.185  
The problem with applying the “reasonable suspicion” standard 
to a student cell phone search is that the level of intrusion is far higher 
than the analogous “pat down” or brief seizure of a suspect. As 
numerous cases demonsrate, searching a cell phone is likely to uncover 
information or images that are highly personal. Adolescents’ lives revolve 
around communication. Just as Justice Souter in Redding acknowledged 
that a teenage suspect’s sensibilities needed to be taken into account 
when contemplating a strip search,186 the same justification can 
reasonably be extended to student cell phone searches. Students may feel 
that the contents of their cell phones, with all the photos, texts, 
appointments and other personal information, are as private to them as 
their bodies themselves and should therefore be afforded a high level of 
acknowledged privacy.187 
                                                
182 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
183 Id. 
184 U.S. v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2010). 
185 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 
186 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009). 
187See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age? 
(Vanderbilt Public Law, Research Paper No. 10-64, 2011; Vanderbilt Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 10-54, 2011) suggesting that a proportionality principle 
should apply to virtual searches whereby the justification for the search is calibrated to 
the search’s impact on the affected party), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734755##. 
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This position is not contrary to the goal of maintaining safety. 
Whereas cell phones are not inherently dangerous, they may be used to 
further criminal activity or rule-breaking. In this case, evidence of illicit 
activity stored on a cell phone is not time-sensitive. While a strip search 
might be warranted immediately in order to prevent a student from 
disposing of evidence, information on a confiscated cell phone can be 
preserved until a warrant is obtained. Tighter restrictions on cell phone 
searches would not hamper administrators from performing other 
searches if they had reason to believe that a student was involved in 
illegal activity; this would remain consistent with a school’s mandate to 
assure student safety and wellbeing. Similarly, if a student is suspected of 
using a cell phone for cheating or bullying, administrators may confiscate 
the cell phone and continue questioning the student. The results of the 
investigation may lead to a punitive sanction or, in the case of bullying, 
the administrators may seek a warrant.188 
Justifying a warrantless cell phone search with a subjective 
“reasonable suspicion” standard in the school setting ignores a 
fundamental aspect of students and their privacy. Students’ freedoms are 
already restricted because they are compelled by law to go to school and 
their in-school lives are governed by school regulations.189 Add to the 
mix that the majority of students carry cell phones (often at parents’ 
request),190 and that young people may lack judgment and discretion 
concerning what they store in their phones. Given these conditions, 
allowing school officials wide latitude to perform searches of cell phones 
                                                
188 Given that cell phones can be used for conduct like cheating and bullying, one can’t 
help but wonder what the true disadvantages are for prohibiting cell phones in school all 
together. 
189 William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 
59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 773 (1974). In this early analysis of school search and seizure 
law, Buss argues for clearer recognition that school administrators should be understood 
as acting on behalf of, or in cooperation with, police. Particularly in cases of suspected 
criminal violations, Buss suggests that excusing the warrant requirement goes against the 
Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985). 
190 Parents in New York actually sued a school district after cell phones were banned 
claiming that it was a violation of constitutional rights and that, because they were 
unable to reach their children by phone, their safety was being endangered. Jennifer 
Medina, Court Upholds School Cellphone Ban, N.Y. TIMES – CITY ROOM BLOG (Apr. 
22, 2008, 6:21 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/court-upholds-
school-cellphone-ban/; see also National School Safety and Security Services Website, 
Cell Phones and Text Messaging in Schools, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/ 
trends/cell_phones.html (parents have lobbied school boards to reverse cell phone bans 
based on safety concerns).  
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violates fundamental Fourth Amendment principles.191 School 
administrators naturally assume authority for younger children under an 
in loco parentis paradigm, but the natural parental qualities of tolerance, 
understanding, and permanence recede as administrators are faced with 
the management of adolescents. While educators may still guide their 
older students with care and devotion, the modern high school must 
necessarily adopt a law enforcement model to cope with the range of 
student misbehavior. Schools have increased security procedures and 
staff; metal detectors, school police officers (known as SROs), random 
searches of students, and zero tolerance policies are now common in 
many public schools. .192 Indeed, in T.L.O., the Supreme Court 
recognized that “in carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions 
pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the 
State, not merely as surrogates for the parents.”193  
A school administrator should therefore not be able to operate 
like a magistrate and render decisions on cell phone searches in school. 
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to have a “neutral and 
detached” magistrate, i.e., a disinterested party, draw reasonable 
inferences from evidence to determine if an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment protections can be justifiably waived.194 A judicial officer 
who reviews a warrant request should be severed and disengaged from 
                                                
191 This view is not out of line with the Supreme Court’s earlier recognition of student 
rights in school. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., a case decided well 
before T.L.O. or Redding, the Court acknowledged that though students are subject to 
a different standard, they must still be viewed as persons under the Constitution. 
“School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in 
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed 
of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect 
their obligations to the State.” 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
192 Aaron Sussman, Learning in Lockdown: School Police, Race, and the Limits of Law, 59 
UCLA. L. REV. 788, 793 (2012); Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered 
Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 884 
(2011) (“In the 1980s, police departments began to assign sworn police officers—
SROs—to schools to combat the scourge of drugs and in the 1990s to provide 
heightened security after high-profile school shootings. Local law enforcement agencies 
typically assign school resource officers (armed and uniformed police officers) to schools 
where they perform traditional law enforcement duties—patrolling campus, 
investigating criminal allegations, and dealing with students who violate school rules or 
the law.”); see also Randall Beger, Expansion of Police Power in Public Schools and the 
Vanishing Rights of Students, 29 SOC. JUST. 119 (2002). 
193 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985). 
194 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)). 
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the activities of law enforcement and have the capacity to determine 
probable cause.195  
Any argument that a school administrator can make a decision as 
a neutral and disinterested party is without merit. Assuming that the 
school does serve in some capacity as a stand-in for a parent, it is hard to 
reconcile that status with someone who is also neutral and 
disinterested.196 More to the point, given that school administrators (or 
school resource officers) are enforcers charged with finding and 
punishing violations, their role could hardly be viewed as neutral.197 The 
principal or administrator who authorizes or conducts the search will 
likely be the one to impose the sanction on the student. Moreover, the 
administrator is tasked with reducing violations, and may even be under 
pressure to do so from a school board or parent group. 
Requiring warrants to search a student’s cell phone would 
admittedly restrict the discretion the Supreme Court has given schools—
a move that might seem ill-advised given concern about in-school crime, 
drug use, and violence. However, statistics do not support the contention 
that incidences of drugs and violence are increasing in schools.198 
                                                
195 Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350-52 (1972). 
196 School officials rendering decisions on the legality of searching one of their students 
invokes the same problem recognized by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, where the justices held that the New Hampshire Attorney General could 
not issue search warrants because he was not neutral and detached. 403 U.S. 443, 450 
(1971) (“Without disrespect to the state law enforcement agent here involved, the 
whole point of the basic rule so well expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson is that 
prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality 
with regard to their own investigations—the ‘competitive enterprise’ that must rightly 
engage their single-minded attention.”). 
197 See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (Invalidating a search 
warrant signed by a Town Justice because “he was not acting as a judicial officer but as 
an adjunct law enforcement officer”). 
198 According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC): “While shocking and senseless 
shootings give the impression of dramatic increases in school-related violence, national 
surveys consistently find that school-associated homicides have stayed essentially stable 
or even decreased slightly over time. According to the CDC’s School Associated Violent 
Death Study, less than 1 percent of all homicides among school-age children happen on 
school grounds or on the way to and from school. So the vast majority of students will 
never experience lethal violence at school.” CDC Website, School Violence: Data & 
Statistics, CDC.GOV (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/ 
youthviolence/schoolviolence/data_stats.html; CDC Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance 
System, Trends in the Prevalence of Behaviors that Contribute to Violence on School 
Property, National YRBS 1991-2011, available at http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/ 
yrbs/pdf/us_violenceschool_trend_yrbs.pdf. 
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According to the Center for Disease Control, the most recent survey data 
(through 2009) shows that drug and tobacco use on school property is 
flat and that neither the sale of drugs nor violence is on the increase.199 
The decrease is part of an overall decline in both youth and adult crime. 
A warrant requirement that allows for an exception in emergency 
situations involving the health and safety of students would cover 
circumstances where examination of phone messages or data could 
prevent imminent harm.  
Such an exception is not without ample precedent. The Supreme 
Court has carved out numerous exigencies justifying a warrantless 
search.200 Underlying these exceptions is an acknowledgment that the 
warrant requirement must give way when there is an immediate risk of 
physical harm or destruction of evidence. In the school context, 
maintaining safety is of paramount concern. Thus, when school 
administrators have credible, reliable information that a threat of 
imminent harm necessitates ascertaining information from a student’s 
cell phone, they should be permitted to search without a warrant.201 But 
anything less than such an immediate and particularized threat should 
not suffice. If there is no immediate threat, the phone should be 
removed from the student’s possession and preserved until a warrant is 
obtained. A cell phone and its data can be preserved while authorities 
notify the police, who have the option to get a warrant.202  
                                                
199 See supra note 198; Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance – United States, 2009, 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.,  Vol. 59, June 4, 2010, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf; National Center for Education Statistics 
Website, Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2011/key.asp. 
200 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (upholding exigent circumstances 
exception where officers do not create exigency through Fourth Amendment violation); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (upholding “emergency aid” 
exception); U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (upholding “hot pursuit” exception 
to prevent imminent destruction of evidence).  
201 Requiring a student to provide administrators with his or her password, if one is 
needed to access the phone, raises other significant questions that are not addressed 
here. 
202 Bryan A. Stillwagon, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 1165, 1204 (2008) (noting that, particularly in drug-related arrests, cell phones 
are useful but information that links a defendant to cell phone use is precisely the 
information that can be used to obtain a warrant). Requiring a warrant for a cell phone 
search is supported by the court’s reasoning in Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 
2009), where the court based its decision, in part, on the fact that the defendant’s cell 
phone itself posed no threat to the arresting officer and once the phone was in state 
custody, the immediate need to preserve and collect data was satisfied. 
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Such a rule may raise questions about what type of harm would 
suffice. Are drug purchases rumored to be occurring on school grounds 
enough? Or must it be evidence of physical harm like information about 
a student who has a weapon and plans to use it in school? Each case 
must be evaluated according to the potential danger. School 
administrators must be able to distinguish between those searches that 
are necessary and those that are seeking more attenuated information.203 
Even in emergency situations, searches should still be reasonably related 
in scope to the original justification for the search.  
There is an obvious contradiction between, on the one hand 
limiting school administrators because they lack neutrality, and on the 
other hand entrusting them to distinguish the cases where imminent 
harm is at stake. However, this is precisely the same balancing act that 
police officers are entrusted to perform. The key lies in applying a 
standard that tips in favor of privacy protection rather than near-baseless 
intrusion.  
A search of a cell phone is far more intrusive than the 
suspicionless drug-testing regimes authorized by the Supreme Court. In a 
random drug test, the student reveals nothing ancillary to the object of 
the test. They are simply found to be “clean” or not. However, a 
suspicionless search of a cell phone might reveal a broad range of 
information—medical, psychiatric, romantic, or otherwise deeply 
private—completely unrelated to the school’s interest in monitoring 
compliance with school regulations. 
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS	  
At present, most schools in the United States have cell phone 
policies in place.204 These policies typically prohibit any conduct 
involving a cell phone that results in students’ distraction from learning. 
                                                
203 The Supreme Court uses exactly this kind of measure in applying the public safety 
exception to the Miranda rule. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984) (“But 
as we have pointed out, we believe that the exception which we recognize today lessens 
the necessity of that on-the-scene balancing process. The exception will not be difficult 
for police officers to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency 
which justifies it. We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively 
between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and 
questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.”). 
204 S. John Obringer & Kent Coffey, Cell Phones in American High Schools: A National 
Survey, 33 THE J. OF TECH’Y STUDIES 41 (2007), available at 
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JOTS/v33/v33n1/obringer.pdf. 
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Some schools allow students to have phones outside of class but prohibit 
their use inside class. Phones are usually confiscated as a sanction.  
The rules as to when an administrator may search a phone should 
adhere to a strict standard that protects students’ Fourth Amendment 
rights. In September 2011, the ACLU of California issued a report on 
privacy and student cell phones. The report suggests a school policy with 
a provision limiting searches. The provision states:  
Notwithstanding any other school policies on searches in 
general, absent reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing with 
the device beyond merely possessing it or having it 
turned on or out in the open, school district employees 
may not search any personal telecommunications device 
without the express authorized consent of the student 
and the student’s parent or legal guardian.205 
This rule does not go far enough because it still allows 
administrators to use “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing206 as a guide. 
Instead, I propose that the policy should read: 
Notwithstanding any other school policies on searches in 
general, school district employees may search a student’s 
telecommunications device only if: 
1) There is specific and credible evidence of 
imminent, specific harm, and 
2) The scope of the search is narrowly tailored to 
address the imminent harm, or 
3) School district employees have obtained 
express, authorized consent of the student and 
the student’s parent or legal guardian, or a 
warrant. 
No policy offers an airtight guarantee that school officials will 
correctly identify illicit activity at the expense of searching a student’s 
phone. Nonetheless, a policy mandating that school officials articulate 
the particular evidentiary basis for searching a cell phone protects the 
privacy interests of students.  
V. CONCLUSION	  
New technologies challenge us to adapt legal principles to new 
circumstances and social norms.207 Developing appropriate constitutional 
                                                
205 ACLU of California, supra note 140. 
206 Id. 
207 Katherine M. O’Connor, OMG They Searched My Texts: Unraveling the Search and 
Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL L. REV. 685, 715 (2010) (proposing that text 
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protections with respect to teenagers is especially challenging because 
their own adolescent standards are ill-formed and appear designed to 
challenge notions of traditional reasonableness.208 Teenagers’ behavior 
should not dictate the limits of their own zone of privacy for precisely 
the same reason that young people’s rights are subjugated: because of 
their lack of maturity. It is a mistake to conclude that teenagers don’t care 
about their privacy based on their choice to share intimate data about 
themselves with their friends via digital devices.209 
Thus, adults should model appropriate standards of conduct and 
uphold our society’s ideals and constitutional safeguards.210 Young 
people increasingly blur the boundaries between private and public, and 
it does them no good if adults enact policies that further blur those lines. 
If we want to teach our students to be more vigilant in maintaining their 
                                                                                                               
messages be analogized to searches under the plain view doctrine and exigency 
exception); see also Leary, supra note 9; Matthew Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless 
Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 183 (2010); Amanda Yellon, The Fourth Amendment’s New Frontier: Judicial 
Reasoning Applying the Fourth Amendment to Electronic Communications, 4 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 411 (2009) (expectation of privacy analysis to emails). 
208 Developments in science and brain imaging strongly suggest that the adolescent 
brain is developmentally incapable of making adult-like decisions and is, by virtue of its 
biological makeup, responsible in part for the poor decisions and risky behavior 
associated with teenagers. See Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and 
Neuroscience: Modern Brain Science, Media Influences, and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 
695, 712 (2005) (“Children, including teenagers, may simply not be as capable as adults 
at inhibiting behavior. There is also evidence that this same lesser development of the 
same region of the brain makes it less likely that children will recognize the 
consequences of their acts.”). 
209 The United States Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged the relative 
immaturity of adolescents, or youths, under age eighteen. In Roper v. Simmons, the 
Court refused to allow the death penalty for children under eighteen. The opinion takes 
note of a youth’s lack of maturity and “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”—
qualities that often “result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” 543 
U.S. 551, 570 (2005). See also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (life without parole 
for juveniles accused of non-homicide offenses violates the Constitution). 
210 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 854 (2002) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“When custodial duties are not ascendant, 
however, schools’ tutelary obligations to their students require them to ‘teach by 
example’ by avoiding symbolic measures that diminish constitutional protections. That 
[schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.”); West Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
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privacy, we send the wrong message by breaching the line of privacy 
ourselves.211 
School administrators are faced with tremendous social pressures 
and their need to maintain order should not be underestimated. 
Nevertheless, the primary mission of schools is to educate. This mission 
would be better served if adults in the school community modeled 
respect for student privacy. Requiring administrators to get a warrant to 
search the contents of a cell phone balances the legitimate safety 
concerns of school administrators with a student’s right to privacy.  
  
 
                                                
211 Not surprisingly, studies now show that older teens and young adults have a keener 
idea of keeping personal information private. A recent Pew study found that eighteen to 
twenty-nine-year olds have a greater concern about reigning in their private information 
than other age groups, vigilantly deleting posts that expose information or images they 
do not want to share. Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Pew Internet, Reputation 
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